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PUBLIC HEALTH THEN AND NOW |
The author is with the Sexual Assault and Violence Intervention Program, Mount Sinai Hospital, New York, NY.
Correspondence: Requests for reprints should be sent to Rochelle L. Frounfelker (e-mail: rfrounfelker{at}hotmail.com).
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ABSTRACT |
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A conflict between industrialization and worker health developed in the painting industry during the early 1900s with the introduction of the spray machine. This technological innovation allowed the application of paint at greater speed and lower cost than hand painting and increased the rate at which painters were exposed to lead and other toxins contained in paint.
From roughly 1919 to 1931, the painters’ trade union clashed with employers, paint manufacturers, and legislatures over the impact of the spray machine on the health of workers and the need to enact legislation to regulate its use. While painters made gains on local, state, and national levels during the 1920s to prevent the use of the spray machine, their efforts ultimately failed.
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INTRODUCTION |
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The right to organize and the right to have a safe place to work are human rights no less than the right not to be tortured.Human Rights Watch1
You have to bring bread and butter to your family. If you say, "I won’t do [an unsafe job] that way," you just get kicked out of the job.Asbestos removal worker2
CONFLICTS IN 20TH-CENTURY occupational health reform often exhibit the tension between the 2 statements quoted above. While public health officials would agree that a safe work environment should be an inherent, unspoken contract between employer and employee, the reality is that workers often have to choose between a paycheck and their health. Economic coercion forcing workers to sacrifice their well-being in exchange for supporting themselves is an all-too-familiar reality for individuals working in unskilled, unsafe jobs where a more desperate candidate can easily replace them. Exploration of the historical roots of this tension between workers’ health and workers’ need for economic stability helps public health officials have a more complete picture of how this issue began; ultimately, it will also serve to inform their efforts at reform.
The time period that provides the context for the spray machine debate, roughly 1919 to 1931, was a tumultuous one for laborers. During the early 20th century, America experienced an economic boom that resulted in the country becoming a world leader in industrial production.3 The rapid speed at which America was developing a thriving economy was matched by the rate of deteriorating work conditions for laborers. Factory work became increasingly dangerous as technologically innovative but unsafe tools were introduced into the workplace. At the same time, companies increased production through "speedups" and other mechanisms that resulted in worker injury and death.4
This economic context was accompanied by an increasingly repressive social environment for laborers. During the 1920s, the government curtailed the efforts of workers to organize and develop political power through the deportation and imprisonment of labor leaders. Antilabor activities were countered by the increased efforts of workers to organize labor unions in order to assert their interests, one of which was worker safety and health.5 The end of the 1920s, which marked the beginning of the Great Depression, shifted the primary interest of laborers to keeping their jobs in a deteriorating economy. The social and economic environment of the 1920s, and the onset of the Great Depression, became key components in the story of unionized painters and their attempt to eradicate the use of the spray machine.
Other historians have studied the early-20th-century paint hazard in general and its application to those laboring in the paint industry more specifically. Whereas Gerald Markowitz and David Rosner focused on paint and childhood lead poisoning, Christian Warren covered this territory and extended his analysis to arenas such as debates over the paint hazard within the realm of occupational health.6 The present study attempts to broaden our understanding of how workers themselves perceived and contributed to debates on occupational health within the painting industry. Perhaps most importantly, the spray machine debate provides an excellent example of the intersection of labor movements, technological innovation, and occupational health in early-20th-century America.7
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LABOR AND HEALTH AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY |
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In order to transfer control to industrial managers, Taylor argued, it was necessary to break down the labor process so that formerly complex tasks could be performed by unskilled, rather than skilled, laborers. One method for effecting this change was through the introduction of specialized machinery that simplified previously complicated jobs. A technological revolution at the turn of the century resulted in the introduction of new and innovative tools, including electric wood carvers, sand-blasters, and conveyers, which made the work of craftsmen in most industries obsolete.9
The spray machine (or spray gun) was one of the new tools making the shift to unskilled labor possible. This shift was taking place in the painting industry before World War I. Alice Hamilton’s 1913 report Hygiene of the Painters’ Trade, issued by the US Department of Labor, noted the sharp distinctions between skilled and unskilled painters and the industries in which they were employed. She wrote that house and sign painters were considered highly skilled craftsmen who were required to undergo 3- to 5-year apprenticeships before engaging in work independently.10 These skilled painters, usually native born, made up the bulk of membership in the painters’ trade union, the Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paper-hangers of America (BPDPA).
In contrast to house and sign painting, painting in factories was rapidly being taken over by unskilled labor. Hamilton wrote that whether parts were being sprayed with paint, such as in the automobile industry, or dipped into paint, such as in factories making structural iron or agricultural tools, very few skilled laborers were needed.11 The introduction of machinery had made these jobs accessible to ordinary day laborers, usually newly arrived immigrants, who were not members of the painters’ union.
These transformations occurring in the painting industry and numerous other trades coincided with a growing concern for the health of workers. Early-20th-century progressive reformers conducted factory investigations and increased public consciousness of the health risks faced by workers throughout the country. This occupational health movement was divided into 2 factions. The first, led by labor representatives and industrial hygienists such as Alice Hamilton, took a more preventative, environmental-based approach to occupational health that looked to work-place surroundings as the cause of disease. These reformers believed that the government should take a prominent role in protecting workers through legislative regulations.12
In reaction to legislative activity, business leaders developed their own response to the growing concern for worker health and safety. After 1910, companies began creating medical service departments, and an increasing number of physicians were employed to care for workers in factories. By the 1920s, industrial medicine was a booming medical subspecialty.13 This arm of the industrial health movement took a decidedly different stance than the one promoted by industrial hygienists such as Alice Hamilton. In addition to showing a preference for industrial self-regulation instead of governmental intervention, reformers affiliated with business also tended to assign blame to the workers themselves for job-related accidents and illnesses.14
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IMPACT OF THE SPRAY MACHINE ON PRODUCTION |
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Gardner and the association asserted several arguments to support the continued use of the spray machine in the painting industry. To begin with, he dismissed the claim that the machine would, as painters feared, cut down on the employment of skilled laborers. Instead, Gardner argued that, given the postwar economic boom, the use of the machine was necessary to counteract the growing gulf between painter supply and demand. In the late 1910s, Gardner stated, "[T]he occupation of the journeyman painter could not in any way be injured by the adoption of spray painting for certain special classes of work, since it is often impossible to obtain sufficient labor to apply the paint for which such enormously increased demands exist."15
Although Gardner and others in the National Paint, Oil and Varnish Association promoted the spray machine by claiming that it would stimulate the painting industry, it is clear from the literature that their main motive was a desire to increase the speed of production and reduce costs. These 2 factors would make the hiring of skilled painters unnecessary regardless of any increases in demand for painting.
Gardner administered paint tests to illustrate the efficiency and economic merits of the spray machine. In one test in the 1910s, workers painted the roofs of government buildings in Washington, DC; Gardner had them paint equal surface areas by both hand and spray machine to prove the laborsaving value of the machine. The results, Gardner reported, showed that "Spraying requires approximately 10% more paint than brushing. Brushing requires approximately 200% more labor than spraying."16
Tests such as these appeared throughout the 1920s to provide evidence that the spray machine could cut down on costs by reducing the amount of labor needed for paint jobs.
Manufacturers’ advertisements also stressed the spray machine’s ability to reduce costs and increase speed. In 1921, the DeVilbiss Manufacturing Company’s catalog—complete with the motto "INSURES [sic] QUALITY, SPEED, ECONOMY AND EFFICIENCY"—claimed that their new spray machine enabled 1 worker to do 2 to 6 times more work than was done previously, applied paint 2 to 5 times faster than the hand-brushing method and, ultimately, would save business owners thousands of dollars each year.17 Thus, the bottom line for paint manufacturers and business owners was the time and money that could be saved with the widespread use of the spray machine.
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CONCERN FOR WORKER HEALTH |
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Although supporters of the spray gun downplayed its negative health affects, they also argued that any potential health risks could be minimized by the use of a protective "mask." In 1923, Gardner advertised that he had designed an improved mask that could be issued to workers at a low cost (10 cents per mask). He recommended that business owners provide spray paint workers with a new mask every few days to protect them from any "unpleasant" vapors and particles.20 Any possible negative health affects of the spray machine could then be reduced quickly and at low cost.
As outlined in the previous section, in the early- to mid-1920s, paint manufacturers presented numerous arguments to encourage use of the spray machine by business owners and its acceptance by painters. By 1921, the Paint Manufacturers’ Association of the United States passed a resolution that briefly outlined these arguments and urged both industry and painters themselves to use the machine whenever possible. Most noteworthy was the resolution that stated that "the Paint Manufacturers’ Association of the United States urges upon master painters and journeymen painters the utilization of the paint-spraying machine in their work to the greatest possible extent."21 Industry was mobilizing to make the spray machine an established part of the painting trade.
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RESPONSE OF THE PAINTERS’ UNION |
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[T]he dollar mark efficiency howlers are endeavoring to place a halo on the constructive genius who conceived spray painting, whereas this man-murdering method of beating down production costs to conform to human greed and avarice properly merits the "brand of Cain" rather than the lying laudation of that vehicle of human destruction—the Spray Gun.23
Union leaders emphasized the need for its members to get involved on the local and state level and to work to pass legislation banning the spray machine. In a letter stressing the need for legislation, the new secretary-treasurer of the BPDPA, Charles Lammert, wrote that all union members should "rise in the mightiest might that it has ever been his privilege to exert and FIGHT IN EVERY CONCEIVABLE WAY against the further inroads in the trade and thereby stop the continued use of the Spraying Machine."24
The first official recognition of the hazard of spray painting came in 1924, when the Wisconsin Industrial Commission investigated the spray machine and established guidelines for the regulation of its use within the state. The commission recommended a variety of regulations setting restrictions on the type of spray equipment that could be used, established mandatory use of ventilation and safety devices, and outlined limits on the number of hours per day painters could use the machines. These regulations sparked debate from both sides of the issue. Whereas painters felt that more stringent restrictions should have been enacted, manufacturers thought the Wisconsin regulations wrongly prevented more widespread use of the spray machine in the painting industry.25
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SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION |
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Despite the evidence of the hazard of spray painting, the scientists made several observations in their surveys that complicated the regulation of the machine. Perhaps most importantly, Smyth and Smyth stated that rates of lead poisoning often differed widely according to factory conditions. In factories with better ventilation systems, for example, the risk of lead poisoning among the workers was reduced. Differences in the composition of the substances being sprayed also produced variability. Smyth and Smyth wrote that the amount of lead the workers were exposed to depended on the amount of lead contained in the paint.27 It would be difficult to come up with regulations covering the wide variety of circumstances that affected the extent to which workers were exposed to poisonous fumes.
Investigators also noted that, although there were definitive signs of lead poisoning among workers examined, relatively few severe cases were found. Smyth and Smyth wrote that this was partly because workers were often subject to "mild absorption from long exposure to low concentrations."28 Workers could therefore stay on the job without feeling sick, even though they were slowly being poisoned. Investigators also attributed the low number of severe cases to "self-selection" among workers in the industry. As long as the level of poisoning was relatively low, workers could continue working for several years without marked incident, and when the poisoning was severe, they could be expected to leave work. As long as more laborers were available to fill the positions of poisoned workers, a safe factory environment was not necessary.
The unskilled laborers needed for spray machine work were certainly expendable. It was this fact that made the final recommendation of both the Pennsylvania and National Safety Council studies controversial. Both surveys recommended that workers be given a physical examination either immediately before or after beginning employment to ascertain whether they had any "physical defects" that might be made worse through exposure. This suggestion was not unique to spray paint workers. In fact, physical examinations of workers both prior to and during employment became one of, if not the, most important aspects of the work of industrial physicians between 1910 and 1930. Workers contested the need for examinations, arguing that although their ostensible aim was preventive care, they were actually used to protect employers by screening out unhealthy—and thus, undesirable—employees.29
Their fear seemed legitimate within the context of the spray machine debate. Smyth and Smyth emphasized the need to examine the blood count of workers at least once every 6 months for signs of lead poisoning; they recommended that workers showing signs of poisoning be removed from the workplace.30
The issue of medical examinations illustrates an aspect of the spray machine debate that focused on the health and behavior of workers themselves rather than on employers and the factory environment. A report published by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics in May 1929 highlights how workers were viewed as partly to blame for health problems that resulted from the use of the spray machine. Even though the bureau’s report did discuss factory environment problems such as inadequate ventilation systems, faulty equipment, and lack of safety regulations, it also addressed the issue of employee noncompliance with safety regulations that were in place in some factories.
The report, for instance, discussed the fact that workers found respirators uncomfortable and inefficient and that many employees "done [sic] the mask only when they see officials approaching."31 In addition, the bureau stated, "operators imbued with a false sense of security were indifferent to the use of safety devices."32 Ironically, at the same time, workers were seen as irrationally fearful of the machine. The following passage taken from the bureau’s report illustrates this point:
In some plants visited printed regulations regarding the use of spray equipment had been posted. . . . These rules or regulations when first displayed were interpreted to mean that the work was extremely hazardous and spray operators promptly quit their jobs. The hiring of new spray operators proved a difficult problem in these plants because of the hysteria or mental stampede among employees at the time. In other plants regulations were posted, with no resulting trouble. This would seem to indicate that the workers in the latter plants were already educated to the possible hazards of the occupation and had a full realization of the necessity of care in the work.33
This passage ignores the possibility that workers were under economic pressure to keep their jobs, regardless of the hazard involved. By not addressing the extent to which economics played a part in the workers’ decision to either ignore safety instructions or leave the job altogether, the report made scapegoats of the workers.
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REGULATING THE SPRAY MACHINE |
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With such a wide range of legislative activity undertaken, it appeared likely that the painters’ union would soon succeed in having the spray machine either regulated or banned. This, however, did not occur. By 1930, the BPDPA had lost the spray machine debate and failed to get any widespread legislation enacted that would protect the health of its workers. An examination of the demise of the debate shows that this failure was largely because of the BPDPA’s drastic shift in position.
In March 1929, one painters’ union member wrote to the BPDPA headquarters, "Health surely is more valuable than money or spray guns, so say goodbye to the spray gun."36 This individual was merely echoing what union leaders themselves had said about the issue in the past. Time and again, editorials in The Painter and Decorator had called for all union members to fight against the greed of employers and manufacturers in order to protect the health of their workers. In 1929, the BPDPA created a "Paint Spraying Fact Finding Commission" in order to gather all available information on the use and effects of the spray machine.37 The commission’s report, published in 1930, changed the BPDPA’s official stance on the issue. In laying out the roots of the debate, the report set out to answer the following 2 questions: "What is the influence of the use of the spray machine on the health of the operator?" and "What is the influence of the spray machine on the economic side of the painting industry?"38 Thus, the commission was essentially reexamining whether or not health was indeed more valuable than the economic benefits of the spray gun.
The commission asserted that the studies undertaken by the State of Pennsylvania and the National Safety Council proved that, although spray painting was potentially hazardous to workers, these hazards had been reduced. The commission cited the studies’ findings that incidence of lead poisoning was declining because lead was slowly being replaced with nontoxic substances. In addition, it wrote that the "mechanical perfection" of the spray machine and the use of safeguards such as respirators and proper ventilation systems had made the machine safer to use.39 Further, it recommended that an educational campaign, conducted among both employers and employees, could solve any problems of noncompliance.40 Thus, the BPDPA had switched their stance from one of absolute prevention of health problems to one that called for the minimization of health hazards.
After looking at the health hazards of the spray machine, the commission turned to investigate its economic impact within the painting industry. That the machine was having a devastating effect on union workers had already been noted in the BPDPA’s survey of local union responses to the spray machine, published a year before the commission’s report was released. In that survey, unions noted that attempts to ban the machine on the local level by prohibiting its use by its painters had largely failed.41 They stated that both the widespread use of the machine and the availability of nonunion men to fill jobs resulted in union men losing money. The survey emphasized that "if the machine is not used by union men, it will be used by non-union men and the brush work that necessarily accompanies its use will also be done by non-union men [italics in original]."42
The Paint Spraying Fact Finding Commission’s report referred to this survey and provided additional evidence that it was imperative for union members to embrace use of the machine. The commission illustrated the economic impact of the spray gun by citing studies, similar to those conducted by the paint manufacturing industry in the early 1920s, that compared the cost of hand painting versus spray painting of the same surface. The conclusion drawn by the commission was that, because spray painting cut down on the cost of labor, it had become indispensable to the painting industry; painters who continued to refuse to use the machine risked being forced out of work entirely. The union claimed that union workers’ acceptance and adoption of the machine was the best way to maintain control of the industry.
Although there was certainly a fear of the short-term monetary impact of not using the spray machine, the union had other concerns. It could face a dismal future if it continued to close its doors to laborers using the machine. In March 1930, one union member wrote to The Painter and Decorator citing examples of other trade unions, such as the Cigar Makers’ International Union and Glass Blowers’ Union, whose membership had declined when their leadership refused to admit machine workers into the unions.43 The union member stated, "We may bury our heads in the sand like the ostrich and refuse to see the advance which the spray machine is making in our industry, but we might better expend the energy to organize the spray machine workers."44 The BPDPA’s commission concluded that, given that the spray machine saved employers time and money on human labor, it had become indispensable to industrial production.45 It was in the union’s best economic interests to adopt the spray gun as a tool of the trade.46
The BPDPA printed an article on the spray paint debate in January 1931, shortly after publishing the Paint Spraying Fact Finding Commission’s report. Members of Seattle’s local union wrote an angry response to the commission’s report, stating that "there had been an effort made to ‘hoodwink,’ ‘put over,’ or ‘pull the wool’ over the eyes of the membership of the [BPDPA]."47 Seattle union members wrote that the commission’s report had had a devastating impact on the union’s battle to ban the use of the spray machine in the city. Lawyers used the commission’s report to convince Seattle’s county commissioners to use the spray machine to paint the city’s new county hospital.48 Local union members wrote, "This fact deprives a large number of Local 300 members of a great amount of work during this very distressing era."49
The BPDPA leadership printed their own reply to the letter by Seattle’s union members. Besides denying that the commission undertook anything but an impartial, thorough investigation of the spray-painting issue, union leaders emphasized that local unions could still regulate the use of the spray machine on their own. The BPDPA stated, "Adoption, restriction, regulation or rejection of spray painting, swinging scaffolds, types of brushes, etc., remain, as they always have been, matters of an entirely local character."50 In the interest of economics, the health of union workers had been relegated to a local, rather than a national, issue.
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CONCLUSION |
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Acknowledgments |
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I acknowledge the guidance and support of David Rosner. The staff at the Tamiment Library and Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, New York University, was indispensable in providing me with access to documents cited in this study. I acknowledge the peer reviewers, editors, and production staff at the Journal for their assistance. I also thank both Gerald Markowitz and David Rosner for inspiring me to work on the topic of occupational health.
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Footnotes |
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Accepted for publication June 29, 2005.
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Endnotes |
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2. Rich Heidorn Jr., "Workers Removing Asbestos Often Must Choose Between Unsafe Conditions or No Job," Philadelphia Inquirer, October 27, 1995, available at http://www.laborers.org/Phili_Medina_10-27-95.html, accessed June 2, 2005.
3. David Rosner and Gerald Markowitz, "Introduction: Workers’ Health and Safety—Some Historical Notes," in Dying for Work: Workers’ Safety and Health in 20th-Century America, ed. David Rosner and Gerald Markowitz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), xi.
5. David Rosner and Gerald Markowitz. "Safety and Health as a Class Issue: The Workers’ Health Bureau of American During the 1920s," in Dying for Work, 53.
6. Gerald Markowitz and David Rosner. " ‘Cater to the Children:’ The Role of the Lead Industry in a Public Health Tragedy, 1900–1955," American Journal of Public Health 90 (2000): 36–46; Christian Warren, Brush With Death: A Social History of Lead Poisoning (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000).
7. David Rosner and Gerald Markowitz explore these themes in their history of silicosis, Deadly Dust: Silicosis and the Politics of Occupational Disease in 20th-Century America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), when they discuss the disastrous health and labor ramifications that resulted from the introduction of new mechanical tools in the dusty trades.
8. Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1998), 75.
9. David Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor: The Workplace, the State, and American Labor Activism, 1865–1925 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 125. For a discussion of how this technological revolution affected specific industries, see chapters 1 and 3; see also Rosner and Markowitz, Deadly Dust, especially chapter 2.
10. Alice Hamilton, Hygiene of the Painters’ Trade (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1913), 5–6, 38–39.
12. See David Rosner and Gerald Markowitz, "The Early Movement for Occupational Safety and Health, 1900–1917," in Sickness and Health in America: Readings in the History of Medicine and Public Health, ed. Judith Walzer Leavitt and Ronald L. Numbers (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1997), 467–481; see also Jennifer L. Gunn, "Factory Work for Doctors: The Early Years of the Section on Industrial Medicine and Public Health of the College of Physicians of Philadelphia," Transactions and Studies of the College of Physicians of Philadelphia 17 (1995): 61–93.
13. Christopher Sellers, "The Public Service’s Office of Industrial Hygiene and the Transformation of Industrial Medicine," Bulletin of the History of Medicine 65 (1991): 42–73; for more information on the development of industrial medicine, see also Harry E. Mock, "Industrial Medicine and Surgery—A Resume of Its Development and Scope," Journal of Industrial Hygiene 1 (May 1919): 1–8.[Medline]
14. Rosner and Markowitz, "Early Movement for Occupational Safety and Health," 478.
15. Henry A. Gardner, A Study of the Practicability of Spray Painting (Paint Manufacturers’ Association of the US, n.d., ca. 1910s), 2.
17. DeVilbiss Spray-Painting System (Toledo, Ohio: DeVilbiss Manufacturing Company, 1921), 1–3.
18. Scientific Section, Educational Bureau, Paint Manufacturers’ Association of the US, Experiments on Spraying Paint on Hospital Buildings (Paint Manufacturing Association of the US, 1924), 63.
19. National Paint, Oil and Varnish Association, Inc, 1922–1923 Yearbook and Report: 214.
20. Henry A. Gardner, An Improved Industrial Protective Mask (Paint Manufacturers’ Association of the US, 1923), 132–133.
21. Henry A. Gardner, Recent Developments in Spray Painting (Paint Manufacturers’ Association of the US, 1921), 16.
22. Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators, and Paperhangers of America, Report of the Paint Spraying Fact Finding Commission to the Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers of America (Lafayette, Ind: Haywood Publishing Company, 1929), 5.
23. Anonymous, "Paint Spray Propagandists Are Persistently Pushing Their Publicity," The Painter and Decorator 38 (August 1924): 350.
24. Charles J Lammert, "Spatter! Spatter!! Spatter!!!: Listen to the Rhythm of the Spray Gun—There Seems No End to Human Greed," The Painter and Decorator 38 (April 1924): 152.
25. Adolph B. Gersh, Occupational Hazards and the Painter, With Special Reference to New York (New York: New York District Council No. 9, 1937), 42–43.
26. Henry Field Smyth and Henry F Smyth, Jr., "Spray Painting Hazards as Determined by the Pennsylvania and the National Safety Council Surveys," Journal of Industrial Hygiene 10 (June 1928): 163–214.
29. For a full account of the controversy surrounding the physical examination of workers during this era, see Angela Nugent, "Fit for Work: The Introduction of Physical Examinations in Industry," Bulletin of the History of Medicine 57 (1983): 578–595; see also Jennifer L. Gunn, "Factory Work for Doctors: The Early Years of the Section on Industrial Medicine and Public Health of the College of Physicians of Philadelphia," Transactions and Studies of the College of Physicians of Philadelphia 17 (1995): 61–93.[Medline]
30. US Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Studies of the Hazards of Spray Painting," Monthly Labor Review 27 (September 1928): 65.
31. US Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Spray-Painting Practices and Hazards," Monthly Labor Review 28 (May 1929): 19.
35. "Spray Painting: S. 4186 in the Senate of the United States," The Painter and Decorator 42 (December 1928): 8–10.
36. Charles W. Gaines, "Why I Oppose the Use of the Compressed Air Spraying Machine," The Painter and Decorator 43 (March 1929): 29.
37. Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers of America, Report of the Paint Spraying Fact Finding Commission, 1.
41. Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers of America, Compressed Air Spraying Machines and Their Effects in Our Industry (Lafayette, Ind: Haywood Publishing Company, 1929), 2–3.
43. Edward Hammond, "What About Spray Machine Workers?" The Painter and Decorator 44 (March 1930): 33.
45. Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers of America, Report of the Paint Spraying Fact Finding Commission, 17.
47. "Spray Painting Is Local Situation; No National Laws Are Involved," The Painter and Decorator 45 (January 1931): 38.
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| HOME | HELP | FEEDBACK | SUBSCRIPTIONS | ARCHIVE | SEARCH | TABLE OF CONTENTS |
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ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION