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PROGRESS, SETBACKS, AND FUTURE NEEDS |
At the time of the study, Michael Givel was with the Institute for Health Policy Studies, University of California, San Francisco, and the University of Oklahoma, Norman, Okla. Stanton A. Glantz is with the Center for Tobacco Control Research and Education, Institute for Health Policy Studies, Cardiovascular Research Institute, University of California, San Francisco.
Correspondence: Requests for reprints should be sent to Stanton A. Glantz, PhD, Tobacco Control Research and Education, University of California, San Francisco, CA 94143-1390 (e-mail: glantz{at}medicine.ucsf.edu).
| ABSTRACT |
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On June 20, 1997 a group of attorneys and health advocates proposed a "global settlement" of all public and private litigation against the tobacco industry. This agreement was controversial, and the subsequent implementing legislation was defeated. We sought to determine whether the global settlement represented a "missed opportunity" or a dead end.
We compared the global settlement with subsequent laws, regulations, settlements, and judgments against the tobacco industry and found that other than Food and Drug Administration regulation of tobacco, tobacco control advocates have achieved many of the policies included in the global settlement and several beyond it.
The policies that have been developed since 1997 have advanced tobacco control substantially, often beyond the provisions of the global settlement.
| INTRODUCTION |
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There was a serious division within the public health community about the global settlements advisability, particularly because of the immunity requirements.3,4 Proponents4 viewed it as a major opportunity to make heretofore unthinkable progress. Opponents (including the second author of this article) saw it as mortgaging the future, as occurred when public health advocates accepted federal preemption on regulation of cigarette advertising in exchange for health warnings on cigarette packages in 1965. While these warnings represented a step forward at the time, the legislation froze the situation in 1965 and has provided the legal basis for the tobacco industry stopping stronger regulation of cigarette advertising at the state or local level. Proponents saw the defeat of the implementing legislation, sponsored by Republican Senator John McCain of Arizona, as a major lost opportunity to advance tobacco control efforts at the federal level.4
In 1998, many of the same state attorneys general who had negotiated the global settlement announced the Master Settlement Agreement5 (MSA), designed to resolve the litigation between 46 states and the tobacco industry. (The other states, Mississippi, Florida, Texas, and Minnesota, had already reached separate settlements.1) Unlike the global settlement, the MSA simply settled the litigation at hand and did not require legislative action. As a result, it could not grant the FDA jurisdiction over tobacco or provide the tobacco industry relief from private litigation, as the global settlement did. Several years have passed since these events occurred, and it is now possible to compare what has happened in tobacco control in the United States with what could have happened if the global settlement had been enacted as originally intended.
| SOURCES OF INFORMATION |
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| ADVERTISING AND MARKETING |
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| YOUTH ACCESS |
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| DOCUMENT DISCLOSURE AND REFORM OF INDUSTRY PRACTICES |
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Second, the MSA required that these documents be made available on the Internet, providing access both domestically and internationally and thereby creating the opportunity for this information to influence policy. The Minnesota settlement also created a depository of the British American Tobacco documents in Guildford, England.15 The availability of these documents has had a substantial impact on national16,17 and international18,19 tobacco control issues.
| SMOKE-FREE INDOOR AIR |
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The global settlement would also have required that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration issue a rule regulating smoking in most workplaces. The Supreme Court has ruled that the Occupational Safety and Health Act preempts state and local laws. The global settlement specified that any implementing legislation would not preempt state and local legislation, suggesting that the Occupational Safety and Health Act would have been amended to remove this preemption.
The tobacco control movement has continued to make progress in creating smoke-free workplaces, often including restaurants and bars, without federal legislation. Between June 20, 1997, and June 20, 2003, 650 communities enacted or amended smoke-free indoor air laws (according to the American Nonsmokers Rights Foundation Local Ordinance Database), and 3 states enacted smoke-free indoor air legislation that included smoke-free restaurants. This trend continued to accelerate in 2003.
| FDA REGULATION |
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While the creation of explicit authority in these areas was broadly supported within the public health community, there was concern that the procedures defined in the global settlement would create several burdensome procedural requirements that would compromise the FDAs actual ability to regulate tobacco.1,24 (Many of these problems were corrected in the McCain bill.) In 2000 the Supreme Court, in Food and Drug Administration v Brown & Williamson,25 ruled that the FDA had no jurisdiction to regulate nicotine or other substances contained in tobacco or to enforce youth access enforcement provisions without congressional approval.25 Because the McCain bill codifying the global settlement was not enacted, tobacco control advocates have been left with a clean slate regarding the FDA in which they have to return to Congress to establish any FDA authority. If the global settlement had been enacted, the FDA would have been given some limited authority over tobacco products. From a public health perspective, it is not clear whether weak authority to provide the basis for action or the current situation of a clean slate is the better outcome.
| LEGAL LIABILITY AND MONETARY PROVISIONS |
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Since the MSA and other settlements did not amend federal or state law, these settlements could not grant the tobacco industry the kind of immunity granted by the global settlement. The industry has lost cases brought by individual smokers in Florida, California, Oregon, Kansas, and Puerto Rico.26 As a result of legal verdicts, settlements, and the MSAand in addition to the other 4 state settlementsthe amount awarded in the years following the global settlement has totaled $184 billion, $72 billion greater than the amount originally proposed under the global settlement for a 25-year period (Table 4
). All but one of these verdicts were still on appeal at the time of the writing of this article.
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| FUNDING FOR TOBACCO CONTROL PROGRAMS |
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Moreover, the budget difficulties of the 2002 fiscal year led many states to reduce funding of tobacco control programs or mortgage future MSA payments through securitization (which involves selling future tobacco settlement revenues for an immediate payment, reducing the money available for tobacco control and health care in the future10) to fill current budget deficits.28 In 2002, at least 18 states and the District of Columbia securitized part or all of their future tobacco settlement revenues. Rather than using it for tobacco control, most states used this money to balance state budgets.10 These difficulties could also have applied to any federal appropriations for tobacco control made under the global settlement; as is the case with the state expenditures, appropriations are made on an annual basis.
| DISCUSSION |
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A major area of "loss" since the global settlement has been the failure to achieve FDA jurisdiction over tobacco products. While there is general agreement that the global settlement created serious procedural problems for the FDA to actually act on this jurisdiction,1 many of these problems were resolved in the bill based on the global settlement sponsored by Senator McCain. On April 2, 1998, the Senate Commerce Committee passed legislation that raised the monetary payments of $368.5 billion, as originally proposed in the global settlement, to $516 billion.
In addition, the McCain bill would have imposed tougher restrictions on tobacco advertising, a less onerous burden on FDA regulation of tobacco, greater monetary penalties on the tobacco industry for failure to reduce teen smoking rates, and higher taxes. It would have eliminated the provisions granting the tobacco industry immunity for future class action lawsuits and other concessions related to private litigation against the industry. With these changes, the billwhich then differed substantially from the global settlementwas unacceptable to the tobacco industry, which successfully lobbied to kill the bill on June 17, 1998.
It is important to emphasize that the purpose of this article has been to compare the global settlement with the situation in 2003. There were several reasons for this approach. For example, the global settlement was presented as an integrated package that was negotiated with the intent of implementing it as written. It was not presented as a starting point for further negotiations. We sought to evaluate the implications had advocates of this position succeeded in having the global settlement implemented as written.
Other than FDA regulation of tobacco and ineffective29 youth access requirements, 6 years after the global settlement was proposed, tobacco control advocates have achieved many of their original policy goals, most notably restrictions on tobacco marketing and substantial amounts of money for the states and some private plaintiffs. There has also been considerable growth in funded tobacco control efforts, both through private foundations created by the MSA and through significant (but substantially less than in the global settlement; Table 4
) state funding for tobacco control. (As mentioned, few states have funded comprehensive tobacco control programs at even the minimum levels recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and those programs remain at risk for future budget cuts.9,27,30)
The availability of the tobacco industry documents, particularly access via the Internet, has spawned an entire new area of investigation in tobacco control17 and has had a substantial impact on the tobacco policymaking process, both domestically and internationally.18,19 Private litigation has continued against the tobacco industry, with several victories for the plaintiffs. Smoke-free indoor air has enjoyed a resurgence at the local level and, in some cases (California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Maine, and New York), the state level. Far from representing "missed opportunities," the global settlement proposal, the subsequent debates leading to its rejection, the MSA, the ongoing litigation in the area, and the policies that have been developed since 1997 have advanced tobacco control substantially.
| Acknowledgments |
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| Footnotes |
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Accepted for publication April 24, 2003.
| References |
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2. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Annual smoking-attributable mortality, years of potential life lost and economic costs: United States, 19951999. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2002;51:300303.[Medline]
3. Bloch M, Daynard R, Roemer R. A year of living dangerously. Public Health Rep. 1998;113:488497.[ISI][Medline]
4. Pertschuk M. Smoke in Their Eyes. Nashville, Tenn: Vanderbilt University Press; 2001.
5. National Association of Attorney Generals. Master Settlement Agreement; 1998. Available at: http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/litigation/usa.pdf. Accessed December 15, 2003.
6. Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub L 8992 (1965).
7. Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act, Pub L 99252 (1986).
8. Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration Reorganization Act, Pub L 102321 (1992).
9. Givel M, Glantz S. State tobacco settlement funds not being spent on vigorous tobacco control efforts. Oncology. 2002;16:152157.[Medline]
10. American Cancer Society, American Heart Association, American Lung Association, Smokeless States National Tobacco Policy Initiative. Show Us the Money: A Report on the States Allocation of the Tobacco Settlement Dollars. Washington, DC: Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids; 2003.
11. Broin v Philip Morris, Circuit Court of the 11th Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida, Case No. 91-49738 CA (22) (1997).
12. State of Minnesota v Philip Morris, State of Minnesota District Court, County of Ramsey Second Judicial District, Court File No. C1-94-8565 (1998).
13. Tobacco Control Resource Center. Recent major tobacco trials. Available at: http://www.tobacco.neu.edu/Upcoming.html. Accessed May 21, 2002.
14. Glantz S, Box B, Lightwood J. Tobacco litigation: issues for public health and public policy. JAMA. 1997;277:751753.[ISI][Medline]
15. Glantz SA. The truth about big tobacco in its own words. BMJ. 2000;321:313314.
16. Malone R, Balbach E. Tobacco industry documents: treasure trove or quagmire? Tob Control. 2000;9:334348.
17. Cummings K, Pollay R. Exposing Mr. Butts tricks of the trade. Tob Control. 2002;11(suppl 1):I1I4.[Medline]
18. Zeltner T, Kessler D, Martiny A, Randera F. Tobacco Company Strategies to Undermine Tobacco Control Activities at the World Health Organization. Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization; 2000.
19. Ong EK, Glantz SA. Tobacco industry efforts subverting International Agency for Research on Cancers second-hand smoke study. Lancet. 2000;355:12531259.[ISI][Medline]
20. Fichtenberg CM, Glantz SA. Effect of smoke-free workplaces on smoking behaviour: systematic review. BMJ. 2002;325:188191.
21. Dearlove J, Bialous S, Glantz S. Tobacco industry manipulation of the hospitality industry to maintain smoking in public places. Tob Control. 2002;11:94104.
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23. Shopl and DR, Gerlach KK, Burns DM, Hartman AM, Gibson JT. State-specific trends in smoke-free workplace policy coverage: the Current Population Survey tobacco use supplement, 1993 to 1999. J Occup Environ Med. 2001;43:680686.[ISI][Medline]
24. Koop CE, Kessler D. Final Report of the Advisory Commission on Tobacco Policy and Public Health. Washington, DC: Advisory Commission on Tobacco Policy and Public Health; 1997. Also available at http://www.lungusa.org/tobacco/smkkoop.html. Accessed December 15, 2003.
25. Food and Drug Administration v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 529 US 120 (2000).
26. Levin M. Tobacco firms struggling in West Coast courts. Los Angeles Times. October 5, 2002:C1.
27. Gross C, Soffer B, Bach P, Rajkumar R, Forman H. State expenditures for tobacco-control programs and the tobacco settlement. N Engl J Med. 2002;347:10801086.
28. Schroeder S. Conflicting dispatches from the tobacco wars [editorial]. N Engl J Med. 2002;347:11061108.
29. Fichtenberg CM, Glantz SA. Youth access interventions do not affect youth smoking. Pediatrics. 2002;109:10881092.
30. Best Practices for Comprehensive Tobacco Control ProgramsAugust 1999. Atlanta, Ga: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; 1999.
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