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EDITORIAL |
Correspondence: Requests for reprints should be sent to Leonard Evans, DPhil, President, Science Serving Society, 973 Satterlee Road, Bloomfield Hills, MI, 48304-3153 (e-mail: le{at}scienceservingsociety.com).
| INTRODUCTION |
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If we could stimulate new approaches to the problems of risk in road traffic as we did about airline security after 9/11, every year we could save many times more lives than were lost that day. This can be achieved with far less reduction of mobility, convenience, freedom, or civil rights than was produced by our ongoing response to 9/11.
| THE UNITED STATES COMPARED WITH OTHER COUNTRIES |
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These better-performing countries view traffic deaths and injuries as much more of a public health problem than does the United States. They support more scientific research aimed at exploring and evaluating countermeasures. Sweden and Australia, with populations less than that of many US states, have more institutions devoted to road safety research than the United States. Rather than respecting technical knowledge, Americans have been persuaded that lawyers such as Ralph Nader and Joan Claybrook should guide policy.
| ROLE OF US LITIGATION |
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Airline safety has improved dramatically because it focuses mainly on preventing crashes, not on surviving them. We continue to kill so many people on our roads because of the mistaken belief that the main way to reduce these deaths is to make every crash marginally more survivable, while largely accepting crashes as inevitable. Litigation can always point out that if the institutions that made the vehicle, road, or traffic control system had done something differently, the outcome of a crash would have been different. This is a trivial truism. Yet the litigation system skillfully transforms this truism into billions of dollars and deflects attention from the countermeasures that could really reduce harm.
| THE 2 MOST IMPORTANT FACTORS |
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An individuals behavior is under his or her control. The more clearly road users acknowledge this, the safer they will be. Yet in the United States the very opposite message is repeatedly reinforced by media coverage of product liability trials. A highprofile trial may perhaps involve a driver who was severely injured (but not killed) after being ejected in a rollover crash. The public is informed that a tire manufacturer was responsible, but not informed that the driver was speeding and not wearing the legally required safety belt that would have made ejection nearly impossible. In some states, a jury must be kept ignorant of the fact that an injured plaintiff was not wearing a safety belt, even though such unsafe behavior is also illegal.9 Instead of encouraging drivers to obey traffic laws, actions over which they have control, the US media coverage defines the problem in terms of manufacturing and design decisions over which drivers have no control.
The actions of other road users pose greater threats to our lives than those of terrorists. About 850 people are killed annually in the US by drives running red lights.10 We are more likely to be killed by a driver running a red light and crashing into the side of our vehicle than by a terrorist bomb on an aircraft. There is no vehicle engineering change that can appreciably reduce this risk. It is a cruel hoax to imply otherwiseside airbags can produce no more than marginal risk reductions.
| THE SOLUTION |
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Modern technology provides the means to automatically detect such illegal behaviors as running red lights, speeding, or tailgating. Cameras that automatically record the license plates of vehicles entering intersections after traffic lights have turned red are already reducing deaths and injuries in many countries (including limited applications in the United States).10 Radar speed cameras have been widely deployed in Britain, Australia, and New Zealand.10 Technology to measure the distance between cars has been developed and field-tested in Israel.11
To reap the enormous safety benefit that such technology can ultimately deliver, we must more warmly embrace a principal that is already implicitly accepted: that driving is a public, not a private, activity. The privacy that is rightly sacrosanct for private activities should not apply to driving because of the enormous threat it poses to others.
Airline pilots are denied privacy on the flight deck, and the speed and altitude of aircraft are routinely monitored. There is already universal acceptance that driving a ground vehicle is not an entirely private activity. Nobody advocates that anyone of any age has the right to drive a vehicle at any speed on either side of the road after consuming any quantity of any intoxicant. The breakthrough that is required is an agreement that other drivers pose so great a threat to our lives that we have the right to enforce traffic laws effectively. Assigning skilled police officers to monitor traffic is an ineffective misuse of valuable public resources. What humans do poorly, technology can do well at a microscopic fraction of the cost.
I believe that the public would warmly embrace the use of technology to effectively enforce traffic law if it were a central component of a fundamental change that included the following 4 policy changes.
Unlike airport security, these proposals would save tens of thousands of lives annually and would not inconvenience, delay, embarrass, or disadvantage any law-abiding citizen.
Accepted for publication December 26, 2002.
| References |
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2. Evans L. Traffic crashes. Am Scientist. 2002;90:244253. Available at: http://americanscientist.org/articles/02articles/Evans.html. Accessed August 2003.
3. Evans L. Transportation safety. In: Hall RW, ed. Handbook of Transportation Science. 2nd ed. Norwell, Mass: Kluwer Academic Publishers; 2002:67112.
4. Transport Canada. Canadian motor vehicle traffic collision statistics: 2000. Available at: http://www.tc.gc.ca/roadsafety/tp/tp3322/2000/en/page5_e.htm. Accessed August 2003.
5. Department for Transport. Transport statistics, Table 9.10. Road accidents and casualties: 19502001. Available at: http://www.transtat.dft.gov.uk/tables/tsgb02/9/download/91002.xls. Accessed August 2003.
6. Australian Transport Safety Bureau. Road safety statisticsfatalities. Available at: http://www.atsb.gov.au/road/stats/timefatl.cfm#roaduser. Accessed August 2003.
7. MVMA Facts and Figures 1981. Detroit, Mich: Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States; 1981.
8. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. International road traffic and accident data. 2001. Available at: http://www.bast.de/htdocs/fachthemen/irtad/english/englisch.html. Accessed August 2003.
9. Blair D. Seat belt defense deserves a fair hearing in Texas [editorial]. Houston Chronicle. February 18, 2003: 19A.
10. Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. Officials nationwide give a green light to automated traffic enforcementcameras to stop red light runners attract far more support than speed cameras. Status Rep. 2000;35(3):13. Available at: http://www.highwaysafety.org/srpdfs/sr3503.pdf. Accessed August 2003.
11. Richter ED, Ben-David G, Ortiz R, Cortes J. A traffic monitoring and driver behavior modification system. USAID CDR Project C8-043, 1995. Also available at: http://www.ukspeedtraps.co.uk/speed01.htm. Accessed August 2003.
12. Blincoe LJ, Seay AG, Zaloshnja E, et al. The Economic Impact of Motor Vehicle Crashes, 2000. Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; May 2002. Report DOT HS 809 446.
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