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HEALTH POLICY AND ETHICS FORUM |
Rudolf Klein is with the University of Bath, the London School of Economics, and the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.
Correspondence: Requests for reprints should be sent to Rudolf Klein, L 12A Laurier Road, London NW5 1SG, England.
| ABSTRACT |
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Drawing lessons from international experience for health care reform in the United States requires striking a difficult balance between historical determinism and free will, between cynical pessimism and naïve optimism. The key to this puzzle may lie in a paradox: the United States is the most successful exporter of public health policy ideas and instruments yet has failed to build an effective health care system.
General ideas (like notions about the role of competition) and microinstruments (like diagnosis-related groups) travel better than do health care systems. Ideas can be adapted to local circumstances, and instruments may easily fit into preexisting systems.
Importing systems from countries with different histories and institutions would require a tectonic shift in the American political landscape.
| INTRODUCTION |
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To draw such a lesson may seem absurd. History is not a film that can be rerun or remade. In any case, the central contention is highly questionable. Constitutional arrangements are surely only part of the explanation for Americas unique failure among rich countries to adopt national health insurance, since these did not prevent the introduction of Medicare and Medicaid despite the opposition of the medical profession and other interests.1
The point of going back to the Declaration of Independence is to remind ourselves about a central dilemma in any lessondrawing exercise. This is how best to strike a balance between assuming that history is allthat the past of individual countries determines the futureand assuming, contrariwise, that policymakers have a free hand in adopting whatever foreign exemplars take their fancy. This article elaborates on this theme: historical determinism versus free will in lesson drawingand how best to steer a course between cynical fatalism and naïve optimism.
| PRISONERS OF THE PAST? |
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What, then, is the point of seeking to draw lessonsabout, say, the best way of funding a comprehensive health care systemfrom countries whose history has not created similarly powerful interest groups and whose political systems do not afford similar opportunities for wrecking strategies? Skepticism is compounded when we consider other factors, such as differences in political culture: can policies reflecting a commitment to the concept of social solidarity be exported to a country conspicuously lacking any such tradition?
The more optimistic free-will approach would argue that systems do change, and not always in ways that can be predicted: social scientists are skilled in rationalizing ex post facto what has happened in terms of the specific institutional and cultural inheritance of individual countries, but accurate ex ante facto predictions based on these same factors are conspicuously rare. Windows of opportunity, as we know, do open, often unexpectedly.3 However, we badly lack convincing window-opening theories; we are better at explaining continuities than discontinuities, paths rather than turnings. And when windows do open, it will be those policy advocates with well-grounded proposals and persuasive arguments (for example, evidence that a particular policy works well elsewhere) who will be best placed to exploit the opportunity.
So even if foreign exemplars offer options that may seem totally unrealistic in todays circumstances, there is no way of telling when they might become relevant and appealing. Indeed, optimists might even argue that acting on the assumption of policy free will could actually bring it about by stretching the imaginations and challenging the assumptions of decisionmakers and the wider public, while historical determinism can all too easily become self-fulfilling by creating a corrosive pessimism about the possibilities of change. In which case, distilling lessons for America from the experience of other countries becomes a useful, if contingent, exercise.
The best way of addressing these contrasting views is perhaps by disaggregating the notion of lesson drawing by distinguishing between different kinds of policies and arenas. The politics of systems reform will be different from the politics of introducing change within the framework of an existing system. And, in turn, the politics of within-system change may vary from issue to issue, bringing different actors and different interests into play. Some may rouse ideological passions: the introduction in the 1990s of mimic markets in Britains National Health Service (NHS) is a case in point.4 These changes did not affect the principles or funding mechanisms of the NHS, but they caused much outrageall the more so because they were seen as an example of lesson drawing from the United States, of all countries (a warning that the perceived provenance of lessons may be an important factor in determining their reception). Other changes may be more technical in character and therefore involve much smaller but concentrated constituencies, such as the medical profession, with a passionate self-interest in the issues at stake.
| THE POLITICS OF SYSTEMS REFORM |
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The case of Britain is worth pondering on further as a warning of the pitfalls of lesson drawing. Lessons drawn tend to vary over time as perceptions shift. So, for many decades, Britain was held out as the supreme exemplar of successful cost containmentas indeed it was. However, at the turn of the millennium, the Labour Government decided that the political costs of successful cost containment were too great. The medical profession and others who had argued that the NHS had been seriously underfunded appeared to be vindicated as the government announced extra billions for the NHS to cut waiting lists, improve services, and introduce (eventually) patient choice.
So what conclusion is to be drawn from this turnabout, from virtue suddenly turning into vice? If tax funding meant that the NHS was indeed underfunded for the first 50 years of its existencea dubious, if widely held, assumptiondoes this mean that the model is fundamentally flawed? Or is the appropriate lesson to draw that the model, despite its flaws, can still be salvaged? Different answers are likely to be given to these questions, depending on the relative weight put on cost containment versus service standards.
If the first lesson to be drawn from the country contributions is that there are different paths toward achieving much the same objectives, the second lesson is therefore that all paths pose problems for the traveler. Dissatisfaction with existing systems appears to be the rule. All the countries covered in this survey are tinkering, to varying degrees, with their systems. As the country reports show, policymakers are continuously striving to repair, improve, and experiment, even in countries that appear to be doing rather wellparticularly when compared with the United States.
If Britain is embarking on radical reform yet againwith the Labour Government reinventing the mimic market (market-like mechanisms designed to increase competition among public-sector providers), so loudly denounced when originally introduced by Mrs Thatchers administrationthis is perhaps no surprise, given a national consensus that the system has failed to deliver. But France has been reengineering aspects of its system, despite placing first in the World Health Organizations notorious ranking exercise. In Germany there is a vigorous political debate about how to reform the system, while Canada is awash with commissions and committees investigating options for the future. If countries are not worrying about spending too little (like Britain), they are worrying about spending too much (like France).
There are, of course, good reasons for this. On the one hand, there are exogenous pressures on health care systems. Some, like the changing demographic structure of the population, are general. Others are specific to Europe: the European Unions common currency rules about budget deficits constrain governments already fiscally stressed as a result of dipping rates of economic growth. Hence the preoccupationBritain always exceptedwith cost containment, an issue that inevitably creeps up the political agenda when economic indicators slide down. Other pressures are endogenous to health care systems. Crossnationally, the configuration of services is changing and new patterns of practice are developing. Thus a common theme across European systems is how to strike a new balance between curative and preventive interventions, between hospital and primary care.
In short, to add to the traditional criteria for evaluating health care systems such as comprehensiveness, value for money, and equity, a new one is now emerging: the ability of health care systems to adapt and changeby exploiting, for example, the opportunities offered by the combination of information technology and evidence-based medicine. Moving from systems or macropolicymaking to the next level of technical or micropolicymaking, where should we be looking for lessons about how to promote flexibility, innovation, and experimentation?
| EXPORTING AMERICAN IDEAS |
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Why? Consider, first, the diffusion of American notions about systems design. One plausible explanation for this is that, since the 1970s, economic theory has played an increasingly important part in shaping social policy while economic reality has been increasingly important in forcing countries to reassess their policy trajectory. Health care is no exception.5 And it so happens that American economistsby sheer weight of numbers, quite apart from any intellectual distinctiontend to dominate the international debate, as a count of journal articles would no doubt confirm. To varying degrees, American ideas and rhetoric about the benefits of competition and the importance of incentives have therefore become naturalized in other countriesa sort of intellectual convergence based on the role of economic ideas in the policy process. Exogenous ideas have been absorbed to the extent that they speak to endogenous concerns: most specifically, how best to adapt paternalistic, solidaristic health care systems to a consumer society where individual choice is sovereign (as is the case in Britain and, to a lesser extent, Sweden and the Netherlands).
The widespread adoption of American policy tools is perhaps less surprising. One way of characterizing health care in the United States is that it represents a heroic but doomed endeavor to bring order to chaos, a never-ending battle to overcome the perversities of a system that might have been designed to fail.
It is this that spurs the participants in the system to ever-greater feats of ingenuity and inventiveness. It is this that promotes managerial, as well as technological, innovation on a scale that no other country can even begin to match. For the outside world, the US health care scene is therefore a kind of supermarket where they can shop selectively. But having shopped, they also adapt; once again, the crucial element is the local environment and contextand the extent to which imports fit, or can be made to fit, local needs.
So here the argument comes full circle. The United States will draw lessons from other countries to the extent that these are most consistent with local circumstances. In health care, there is no such thing as "the best buy" system. And lessons are learned not because of the intrinsic merits of some foreign system but because of the compatibility of its features with the institutions and ideology of the importing country. For the United States, the lessons learned are therefore likely to depend on whether increasing inequality, linked to increasing economic turbulence, produces a tectonic shift in the countrys political scenery.6
| Footnotes |
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Accepted for publication August 12, 2002.
| References |
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2. Tuohy CH. Accidental Logics: The Dynamics of Change in the Health Care Arena in the United States, Britain and Canada. New York, NY: Oxford University Press; 1999.
3. Kingdon J. Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies. 2nd ed. New York, NY: Harper Collins; 1995.
4. Klein R. The New Politics of the NHS. 4th ed. Harlow, Essex, England: Prentice Hall; 2001.
5. Fox D. Economists and Health Care. New York, NY: Prodist; 1979.
6. Phillips K. Wealth and Democracy. New York, NY: Broadway Books; 2002. Cited by: Madrick J. The power of the super-rich. New York Review of Books. July 18, 2002:2527.
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