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LETTER |
Eula Bingham is with the University of Cincinnati College of Medicine, Cincinnati, Ohio. Les Boden, Richard Clapp, and David Ozonoff are with the Department of Environmental Health, Boston University School of Public Health, Boston, Mass. Polly Hoppin is with the School of Health and Environment, University of Massachusetts, Lowell. Sheldon Krimsky is with the Department of Urban and Environmental Policy and Planning, Tufts University, Medford, Mass. David Michaels is with the Department of Environmental and Occupational Health, School of Public Health and Health Services, George Washington University, Washington, DC. Anthony Robbins is with Tufts University School of Medicine, Boston, Mass.
Correspondence: Requests for reprints should be sent to David Michaels, PhD, MPH, Department of Environmental and Occupational Health, School of Public Health and Health Services, George Washington University, 2100 M St NW, Suite 203, Washington, DC 20037 (e-mail: eohdmm@gwumc.edu).
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Judging by his simplified summary of what he believes to be the aims of the Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc, decision, Gori appears to have misunderstood much of what was presented in the July supplement to the Journal. Scientific reasoning is no more amenable to a mechanical approach than is legal reasoning. Daubert imposes unreachable objectives on judges: to separate science from nonscience and good science from bad science. Many of these concerns, which were detailed in the supplement,17 went unaddressed by Gori.
Legal disputes about public health and medical science often involve research at the frontiers of
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