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June 2002, Vol 92, No. 6 | American Journal of Public Health 955-960
© 2002 American Public Health Association

RESEARCH AND PRACTICE

Tobacco Industry Surveillance of Public Health Groups: The Case of STAT and INFACT

Ruth E. Malone, RN, PhD

The author is with the Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences, School of Nursing, and Institute for Health Policy Studies, University of California, San Francisco.

Correspondence: Requests for reprints should be sent to Ruth E. Malone, RN, PhD, Institute for Health Policy Studies, Box 0936, Laurel Heights Campus, University of California, San Francisco, CA 94143-0936 (e-mail: rmalone{at}itsa.ucsf.edu).

Objectives. The goal of this study was to describe how the tobacco industry collects information about public health groups.

Methods. Publicly available internal tobacco industry documents were reviewed and analyzed using a chronological case study approach.

Results. The industry engaged in aggressive intelligence gathering, used intermediaries to obtain materials under false pretenses, sent public relations spies to the organizations' meetings, and covertly taped strategy sessions. Other industry strategies included publicly minimizing the effects of boycotts, painting health advocates as "extreme," identifying and exploiting disagreements, and planning to "redirect the funding" of tobacco control organizations to other purposes.

Conclusions. Public health advocates often make light of tobacco industry observers, but industry surveillance may be real, intense, and covert and may obstruct public health initiatives.




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